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When I was invited to introducé the
subject: "Social (in)security and poverty as
world issues" with référence to Africa, it
was not difficult for me to think up a
working title. Ask the old men and the old
women of the Sahel, sitting in the shade of
the baobab tree, what they believe
constitutes their wealth, and they will
often teil you: "To get rieh, we need many
children who can help us in the fields, and
who can care for us later when we can no
longer work in the fields ourselves." In the
collection of interviews entitled At the
desert's edge; oral historiés from the Sahel2
Fatimata (62) from Burkina Faso says: "I
prefer a large family. If some children die,
there are still some left to help you when
you are old." In academie publications too,
African kinship relations and principles of
sohdarity are often cited as an example of a
typically African system of social security.3
But although "Children as Social Security
in Africa" is a convenient, arresting title,
when considered in relation to the Sahel in
1994 it should really be phrased as a
question. To begin with, it is too limited a
point of departure. Furthermore, having
lots of children actually leads, indirectly, to
social insecurity.
I would like to construct my address
around three thèmes. The first thème is
the relationship between natural resources
and social security in the Sahel. I shall
focus on the fact that, through an interplay
of many factors and actors, the natural
process of régénération following
calamities such as periodic drought is no
longer sufficient to re-establish the
ecological balance. We can therefore speak
of a process of degeneration of the factors
and actors connected to the ecosystem.
This leads to the depletion of increasingly
scarce natural resources and to escalating
compétition for their use.
The national governments of the Sahel and
development aid organisations have in
genera! reacted with short-term solutions
and by attacking Symptoms. And this
brings me to the second thème. We are
forced to acknowledge that after 30 years
of development aid, the environment in
the Sahel is continuing to degenerate at the
same rate. That is why development aid is
increasingly called a bottomless pit. Is this
verdict correct, and if so, why?
On the basis of these first two thèmes, I
shall try to provide a partial analysis of the
changes in the Sahel that have led to the
current situation. And I will conclude by
suggesting possible solutions. The new
buzz-word in the Sahel is décentralisation,
and this is taken to include the
decentralised management of natural
resources.
• Why? Can décentralisation in any way
help stop the process of environmental
dégradation so that the exploitation of
land, forests and water will be
sufficiently productive for present and
future générations of users?
• If so, howcan this be done, andabove
all:
• Under what conditions?
Natural resources and social security in
the Sahel
Let's begin with a number of observations.
• Presently the majority of the
inhabitants of the Sahel are still living
in rural areas, and this rural population
has to provide food (grains and méat)
' With thanks to Teun Pelser for his construcnve comments m the wrmng of this report Dakar, 3 March 1994
'London Panos Pubhcications [1991]
3 See, for instance, T Locoh, "Les familles affncames face a la crise", Afrique contemporaine, 2, no 166, 1993 3-13
and firewood (for preparing the food)
both for its own needs and for chose of
the urban population.4
• Experts - soil scientists, agricultural
scientists and foresters - all agrée that
the ecological balance in the Sahel has
always been extremely fragile.
• The Sahel has always suffered longs
periods of drought and other natural
disasters.
In the book At the desert's edge, to which I
have referred above, many old women and
men recount the rainless years of their
youth, periods that were followed by
plagues of locusts that devoured their crops
in an instant. In Burkina Faso, each
natural ealamity even had its own name, in
the manner of hurricanes.
'Many of the significant events in our life
have been marked by famine. The famine
of Naba Koabga was one of the most
important (...) 30 years after the famine of
Naba Koabga was the famine of Piiss'Wai
(literally 90), which was exactly 51 years
ago. Between these two gréât famines was
the famine of Suya, which means
grasshoppers.' [1991: 119].
Those were years of starvation on a diet of
leaves and wild nuts and berries, years of
sickness and death, and of death among
the cattle. We can refer to this as periodic
degeneration. But after this would come
periods of regulär rainfall, of plentiful
harvests and of recovery of the livestock. In
other words, the ecological balance was
gradually restored without external
intervention, and the population could
once again live off the fruits of the land,
hunting, and the milk from passing cattle.
The environment thus possessed an ability
to regenerate.
In recent years, the Sahel has experienced
another two periods of drought in swift
succession: one in the early 1970s and
another in 1984-1985. The media
publicised the Sahel as a région of
emaciated infants and cows too weak to
stay on their feet. But now, ten years after
the last drought, not only has the
ecological balance still not recovered, but
the environment is rapidly deteriorating.
What's more, ecologists speak of
impending doom, in that some areas have
almost reached the point of no return.
What has happened? I shall not attempt to
give an exhaustive account of every single
cause but, without going into too much
detail, I should like to dweil on some of
the contributing actors and factors.
Firstly, between 1960 and 1990 the
population increased sharply5: population
growth has now reached an annual average
of 3% as against an approximate 2.5% in
the 1960s. By and large this is the result of
a marked decrease in mortality rates owing
to better health provisions, information
campaigns and so forth. Naturally, this is
something we can only delight in, and
even take a little pride in, because of the
rôle played by our development aid. But
birth rates during this same period barely
decreased.6
Not only has the human population
dramatically increased in number; cattle
are also far more numerous. This is partly
due to vaccination campaigns, but there is
more to it. The possession of livestock has
always been an important manifestation of
social status, and so it remains today.
What's more, livestock has become
increasingly important as a méat supply for
the steadily growing urban population, for
fertilizing agricultural land, and for
traction. And finally - and perhaps this is
the most significant factor - livestock has
now become a substantial nest egg for rieh
traders and public servants. And as long as
bank deposits yield less return than
investments in livestock, we will see the
Peuls and Bororos, who used to be thé
principal nomadic cattle breeders in thé
4 Between 1960 and 1990 thé urban population mcreased more than sixfold m absolute terms (from 28 to 183 million)
Expressed as a percentage the growth rate has nsen from 14% to 38% See Afrique contemporaine 1992: 29
5 Between 1950 and 1980 thé population trebled; see Afrique contemporaine, 1992/4: 10, 27.
6 On average 48.30 per thousand; see Afrique contemporaine, 1992/4: 26.
C H I L D R E N AS SOCIAL S E C U R I T Y IN A F R I C A ' 130
Sahel, being employée! by city-dwellers as
herdsmen.
The enormous growth of both the
population and livestock has increased
pressure on natural resources to such an
extent that saturation point has now been
reached almost everywhere. And of course
this leads to increasingly keen compétition
to procure these ever scarcer resources and
to an escalation of violent conflicts among
crop-farmers, between crop-farmers and
livestock producers, between immigrants
and the established population, and even
between different countries. Détérioration
of the natural environment thus also leads
to disintegration of social and political
structures.
A second cause underlying the
environments diminishing resilience to
natural calamities certainly relates to the
development intervention of the 1960s,
which focused chiefly on modern large-
scale agricultural projects. One example of
this is peanut production in Senegal: in the
1960s, premiums were awarded for each
hectare of land cleared of trees and shrubs
so that the soil could be better cultivated
to improve the peanut yield.
These large-scale agricultural projects did
not resuit in the desired green révolution,
but offen in deforestation, forced
migration and therefore, once again, in
environmental dégradation and a
disintegration of social structures.
Finally - not that I have covered all the
relevant issues, but because limited space
nécessitâtes making a choice - the 1970s
saw an economie world crisis in which
world priées for agricultural products
collapsed. Farmers received less for
their cash crops and therefore extended
their farmland to ensure a sufficient
income.
Now that we have reviewed these factors of
dramatic influence on the environment,
we can conclude that the production
potential of the ecological order as it now
stands is no longer sufficient to feed the
population of the Sahel. This has meant a
decrease in social security for the
inhabitants, and all the problems this
entails.
Development aid: a bottomless pit?
After thirty years of development aid
amounting to billions of guilders, the
Sahel has reached a critical point. It seems
legitimate to ask whether these billions of
guilders have not simply been thrown into
a bottomless pit. If there is any truth at all
to this, how can we explain it, and what
should be done to turn the tide?
Broadly speaking, charitable donations are
often generated by exploiting the visual
impact of the Symptoms of poverty (the
walking skeletons of the Sahel), after
which the money is spent on treating these
Symptoms. At neither stage, in général, is
there an in-depth analysis of the problems.
Through the obfuscating effects of treating
Symptoms, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to identify the deeper causes
behind this process of degeneration.
I believe that the strongly project-oriented
bias of development aid is largely to blame
for the failure to tackle the real causes of
the degeneration process.
Anybody who has had anything to do with
project aid knows how it works. An
identification mission turns up and, after a
few weeks of discussions and field visits,
establishes the causes of the problem,
which are in reality Symptoms of the
problem, and by dashing headlong into
the treatment of Symptoms it reinforces
the bottomless pit theory. For instance, the
mission observes that a certain area has too
few trees, which is aggravating soil érosion
and causing fuel shortages. The land is
therefore less fertile and the women have
to walk further and further to collect
firewood, and even there thé végétation is
becoming increasingly scarce. The mission
draws up a substantial project report
describing thèse observations at length,
complète with short and long term
objectives and a budget. Next a
reforestation project gets off the ground
and 10 million dollars, say, are invested in
the planting of eucalyptus trees. After a
while an évaluation mission cornes along;
they see thé eucalyptus trees planted along
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the track and confirm that the objectives
have been reached. Years later it turns out
that there is little left of the wood through
lack of upkeep, and the whole process has
to be started anew.
Combined with the existing pressure to
spend that is feit by many donors, this
process of treating Symptoms leads to
absurd situations: Right now Burkina Faso
would appear to have enough chemical
fertiliser to last for the next four years...!
In the meantime those working on projects
almost everywhere have moved on to an
integrated approach, but unfortunately it
has to be admitted that these integrated
projects are poorly coordinated. This is
particularly true of projects funded by
several donors, each of whom has his own
particular "kingdom" to protect.
I am painting a somewhat ironie picture of
this process, and I am fully aware that in
doing so I risk trivialising die work of
many serious development workers. But by
portraying events in this rather schematic
and provocative way, I wish to show that a
policy of treating Symptoms leads in the
first instance to a search for short term
solutions. Questions relating to the real
causes of the tree shortage (or of the poor
grain yield, or of the depleting pasture
lands) are avoided. For instance, we know
that rapid population growth is one of the
underlying causes. This can only be
seriously tackled by a rigorous policy of
population control. And - as is widely
known - the potential for this is severely
limited by deep-rooted ideological,
religieus, cultural and ethical barriers.
I will not dweil on the subject of
population control. After many
conversations with experts on this topic,
and after heated discussions with men,
women and children from numerous
villages and cities in the Sahel, I realise that
there are no simple, ready-made solutions
to the population problem, and that only
after a long and arduous process will birth
control become a reality. Let me conclude
this topic by referring you to a publication
produced by the United Nation's
Population Fund in 1991, entitled:
"Population, Resources and the
Environment. The Critical Challenges".
So we will have to look for other ways of
halting the process of ecological
degeneration and social disintegration.
Over the last 30 years, many development
models and new paradigms have been
devised. I will not discuss their merits here,
especially since most of them are een tred
on économies, and as a non-economist, I
would be on slippery ground. But the last
few years have seen the émergence of a
new trend that is very populär with the
World Bank and IMF as well as with
bilateral and multilateral donors, and
national governments in the Sahel (and in
all developing countries): namely,
décentralisation. This is a subject on which
I do feel qualified to comment, as a lawyer
with a particular interest in institutional
and légal conditions for the decentralised
administration of natura! resources in the
Sahel.
Décentralisation: why, how, and under
what conditions
At the risk of seeming pedantic, I should
like to begin with a few définitions, so as
to preclude misunderstanding.
Décentralisation is defined in the
textbooks as the transfer of regulatory and
executive compétence to local authorities,
without central government retaining a
supervisory rôle. I prefer to distinguish
between two complementary tracks of
décentralisation:
• the création of conditions that enable
local communities to manage their own
resources; and
• administrative reforms whereby central
powers are transferred to local
governments.
The present proposais for décentralisation
in the Sahel are mainly confined to
administrative reforms. Moreover,
décentralisation is often confused with
dévolution: the transfer of limited powers
to local or regional bodies (mainly
government agencies), powers which may
only be exercised under the supervision of
the central authority.
Quantitative indicators, and qualitative
ones even more so, can be used to show
that African countries are ail firmly
centralist, even by comparison with thé
most centralist of Western countries, such
as France. The most significant
conséquence of having a centralist state is
that the opportunities for local
communities to create their own forms of
organisation and to engage in collective
action are limited, and that législative and
executive power is concentrated in the
hands of just one or a small number of
people. In a study conducted in 1990, The
failure of the centrahzed State7, it was
J -J
convincingly demonstrated that this
severely hampers economie development.
Even in countries such as Senegal, which
practises a cautious form of decentralised
administration, the results in terms of
economie development and more
sustainable management of non-renewable
resources are disappointing. This is mainly
because décentralisation is actually aimed
at expandmg existing state structures at
local level. The drawback is that local
institutions do not have sufficient
autonomy, their policies can still be
unilaterally rejected by the government,
and they are accountable to central
government rather than to the local
population. It may be added that donors
themselves have reinforced the centralist
policy in the countries of the Sahel to a
certain extent by tending to use existing
state structures - often through laziness - as
a channel for development funds.
For these reasons there is now a recognized
need for real décentralisation, and even for
self governance, which goes a step further.
What does this involve? I quote the
authors of The failure of the centrahzed
state, to which I have already referred:
'(Self-governance is) a policy where the
people are able to seek and develop
partnerships with one another in the
development process; where they can
fulfil their potential for self-
orgamzation at multiple levels on which
they hold the legal rights and diverse
resources to engage in collective action.
7 J W Wunsch & D Olowu (eds ), Boulder Westview Press
Under a regime of self-governance, the
state's primary rôle is to act as a
framework of rules which empowers
and facilitâtes the people, encouraging
relations of mutual respect and
coopération among them and abating
opportunities for prédation and
exploitation. Under this regime they
can organise, learn, and act with one
another to construct the more complex
social, economie and political
relationships which are necessary for
development to occur. The state's rôle is
'to set the stage' rather than 'write the
script'" (1990: 14-15).
Applied to the management of natura!
resources, décentralisation implies that
certain guidelines are formulated at
national level e. g. in a legislative
framework and that a national policy plan
is then set out and implemented at
regional and local level, which can be
specially adapted and fleshed out
according to local circumstances. Scruting
of such local régulations should in the first
instance be carried out at local level.
Let me illustrate this with a concrete
example. At the beginning of the dry
season in the Sahel, végétation is often
burnt (the feux de brousse). This practice
was long prohibited in the countries of the
Sahel, and this has led to evasive action,
the bribing of forest wardens and
uncontrollable forest fires. Then at some
point it was realised that under some
circumstances burning can have a
favourable effect. For instance, livestock
breeders set fire to the dry grass during the
dry season, allowing new shoots to sprout
so that their livestock can graze once more.
Cotton plant growers, too, set fire to
stubble after the harvest in order to destroy
the eggs of parasites. Therefore a genera!
prohibition of feux de brousse throughout
the country makes no sensé. In a few
countries of the Sahel, national législation
has now been amended to allow the
practice of feux de brousse under certain
circumstances. This makes it possible for
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provisions to be drawn up at régional and
local level which authorise the burning of
végétation during certain periods.
With décentralisation it is hoped that a
policy can be created at local level that is
aimed at re-establishing natures
regenerative potential by exploiting thé
available local knowledge.
The next question is how and under what
circumstances one can ensure that such a
local policy will have the desired effect.
There is no ready-made blueprint at hand,
and what follows is merely an attempt to
devise a model that could serve as a basis
for initiating a process of decentralised
management of natural resources.
A three-track policy is a good starting-
point. First of all, those who are entrusted
at local level with formulating and
implementing a policy for natural
resources must attend a thorough,
multifaceted course of training. Besides
having a broad area of expertise, they
should know how to disseminate
information as well as being able to
provide a permanent analysis of the
available local knowledge and of the local
social, economie and political processes.
Next, possibilities should be created for
continuous in-service training. Lastly it is
essential that these local, versatile
"environmental experts" are remunerated
generously, not only to increase the appeal
of their post (and to reduce the lure of the
city), but also because it would make them
less susceptible to bribery and
manipulation within the patronage
networks that play such an important rôle
in Africa.
The second track of this policy is oriented
towards the local population, from which a
council of "sages" could be formed, to
serve as a sort of parliament next to the
local "environmental experts". Discussions
are still in progress about how to form this
parliament or local forum (whether
members should be elected or appointed,
and what criteria should apply) and about
the geographical unit within which it
would function (one or several villages, a
commune rurale, province etc.). But
whatever the outcome, a continuous flow
of information and opportunities for
training will have to be created, that will
help them identify and formulate the
priorities of the population (as a resuit of
which they could make a real contribution
to the drafting of policy plans) and subject
policy implementation to critical
scruting. Participation and
accountability are necessary prerequisites
to this strategy.
Finally, the third track is targeted at the
national level: it calls for specialists who
are available on demand and who can
moreover act as thermometers; in other
words it calls for specialists who can play
an ongoing évaluation rôle in their field.
I must stress that I am merely suggesting a
possible framework and not a concrete
form of décentralisation that has been tried
and tested in part of the Sahel. At the
moment throughout the Sahel - especially
in Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal - people
are still in the planning and expérimental
phase. One of the options that these
countries are experimenting with, aside
from administrative décentralisation, is the
contractual approach, i.e. the 'public-
private partnership'; here the government
and local communities enter into a
contract for the management of, say, a
forest.
If one really wants to arrive at some sort of
sustainable local environmental policy,
then it is not sufficient to create new laws
and structures; there also has to be -
perhaps more than anything else - a
change of mentality both within the local
population and within the government.
Thirtyyears of development aid and failed
state intervention have engendered in the
public a passive and rather helpless,
insecure mentality. At the same time their
suspicion of anything that has to do with
the government has greatly intensifïed.
Therefore, their faith in their own abilities
as well as in those of the government has
to be rebuilt. A change of mentality is also
called for in the first instance at the
governmental level, and that cannot be
enforced by means of administrative laws
alone. Public servants will have to
refashion what is often a paternalistic - and
occasionally repressive - rôle into one that
is more advisory and supportive. To put it
into modern jargon, they will have to
become the local représentatives of the
"enabling state".
There is far more that could be said about
the forms of décentralisation, and the
necessary conditions, but given the limited
space, I wish to go on here to formulate
some genera! conclusions.
Conclusion
Is décentralisation the one and only answer
to the process of environmental
degeneration and to the process of
disintegration of social and political
relations in the Sahel? Of course not.
Although expectations of décentralisation
are extremely high, its dangers and pitfalls
are often grossly underestimated.
The expectations of décentralisation can be
summarised as follows. It will lead to:
• a better and, above all, better motivated
participation of the local population in
local development policy, and therefore
in development projects;
• a better, more efficient and goal-
oriented management of natural
resources and public services; and
therefore:
• a more sustainable development and
improved social security for thé
population of the Sahel.
As already noted, décentralisation also has
its pitfalls. Let me enumerate three of
thèse.
1. Décentralisation threatens to become
the new mascot of the international
donor Community. The various donors
- the World Bank, USAID, France,
Switzerland, just to name a few - are all
scrambling to outdo one another.
External powers occasionally come close
to infringing upon the sphères of
influence of what are in principle
sovereign states.8 As a result of this
external pressure, the Sahel nations are
in danger of accepting décentralisation
in theory, but of doing little to flesh it
out in practice. The tradition of
centralist policies is deeply rooted and
there is much fear of ethnie
régionalisation.
2. Another danger is that the policy of
décentralisation may be introduced too
rapidly. If this were to happen we
would once again run the risk of
treating Symptoms alone, and
overlooking complex processes, at
national and local level, which could
either strengthen or weaken the process
of décentralisation. I am referring here,
for instance, to the necessary
technological solutions which could
contribute to a recovery of the
ecological balance. On a completely
different level, there is also the problem
of how to strengthen democracy at grass
roots level, and the risk of
décentralisation actually reinforcing
existing patronage relations, for
instance, or hierarchical social
structures.
3. Finally, décentralisation is being
emphasised in a period of structural
adjustment programmes, which are
compelling thé Sahel countries to curb
government spending drastically. As
long as thé national governments hâve
not really formulated a social policy of
their own, there is a danger that
décentralisation will be used first and
foremost as an excuse to ofifload thé
costs of such policies (food supply,
éducation, health) onto thé local
population who simply haven't thé
means to cope with them.
The already fragile social services in thé
Sahel are being dismantled still further
and, under thé guise of décentralisation,
they are being privatised and decontrolled.
In thé présent social context of the Sahel,
this means that African kinship relations
and solidarity principles are once again
being heavily relied upon for basic social
services. And that takes us back to square
one.
8 See M Doornbos, 1993, "Staatsvorming onder toezicht- de zorg om 'good governance' ", m Antropologische
verkenningen, 12,4 32-41
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Décentralisation can only contribute to thé
regenerative potential of the ecological
System, and therefore to an improvement
of social security in thé Sahel, once we are
prepared to take a long-term view of the
problem, and when this process has been
properly integrated into the complex of
technical, social and political processes of
renewal that are emerging in thé région.
Only then can we rephrase thé title of this
address and actually begin to create social
security for children in thé Sahel.
I am well aware that I have only dealt with
a limited aspect of the very broad thème
"social (in)security and poverty in Africa as
world issues". I hâve focused on thé Sahel,
thé only région in Africa that I hâve any
personal expérience of, with particular
référence to thé rural population.
Moreover I hâve tried to confine myself, as
far as possible, to my own particular field.
I should like to end by formulating two
provocative statements:
1. Development aid will remain a
bottomless pit as long as it is targeted at
thé treatment of Symptoms and as long
as insufficient money and time is spent
on analysing the complex of factors and
actors that can lead to positive
régénération or négative degeneration
of the environment.
2. Décentralisation can only contribute to
a recovery of the environments
regenerative potential and to improved
social security if at the same time
conditions are being created that
promote thé best possible use of local
knowledge and local initiatives.
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